Knowing in feeling by Standish, P
301Paul Standish
P H I L O S O P H Y   O F   E D U C A T I O N   2 0 1 5
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 2015  |  Eduardo Duarte, editor 
© 2016 Philosophy of Education Society  |  Urbana, Illinois
Knowing in Feeling
Paul Standish
Institute of Education, University of London
I
The starting point for my discussion is music. It is a characteristic of devel-
opment in music that its innovations and specifically its avant-garde challenge its 
audience. In a sense this must be the case by definition, but my suggestion is that 
this occurs in music in a way that is more pronounced than in the other arts. At its 
inception, be-bop was not for the faint-hearted, while free jazz can sometimes leave 
its audiences bewildered. Charlie Parker’s desire to exploit all twelve notes of the 
chromatic scale echoed the revolution that Arnold Schoenberg had more or less 
brought about. And Schoenberg’s music and its legacy, through the middle decades 
of the twentieth century, continued to baffle audiences, perhaps in unprecedented 
ways. In some respects, the question was the one that could be heard in the galleries 
and museums: “Is this art? What can it mean?” Innovation in the literary arts around 
this time produced troubled reactions too, but given that words are, as it were, con-
demned to mean something, the question arose perhaps in a less ground-shaking 
way. Visitors could be mystified by Carl André’s “pile of bricks,” but at least they 
could see they were bricks. Moreover, while in the gallery one could simply take a 
look and then walk away, the audience in a concert hall is more or less captive for 
the duration of the performance. In sum, then, the challenges of music at this time 
proved especially testing, and audiences were often at a loss as to what they were 
listening to. Was this really music at all, or was it just a noise?
I propose in what follows to examine the nature of this difficulty with reference 
to an essay from 1967, Stanley Cavell’s “Music Discomposed,”1 in which he ponders 
the nature and effects of modernist experiments following Schoenberg and Anton 
Webern. The interest of this essay has to do in part with its thematizing of what it is to 
mean something (as opposed to faking it, posturing, copying another’s views, and so 
on). In the process, it addresses questions regarding the nature of aesthetic experience, 
judgment, and responsibility. These, as I shall try to show, are significant not only 
for aesthetic education but for broader questions of educational policy and practice.
Cavell’s discussion is structured around two kinds of response to the avant-garde. 
First, there is the traditionalist response, epitomized by the story, apocryphal or not, 
of Saint-Saëns’s storming out of the first performance of Stravinsky’s The Rite of 
Spring. Apparently, the performance led Saint-Saëns to question Stravinsky’s sanity 
and to say, on hearing the haunting opening solo, “If that’s a bassoon, then I’m a 
baboon.”2 The second is represented by the composer-critic Ernst Krenek, whose 
response is characterized by an unswerving commitment to the theorization, upon 
which the new music seemed to thrive. As Cavell points out, this music was nothing 
if it was not philosophical: that is, its devotees appeared to give as much attention to 
its theorization as they did to its production, and musical scores themselves seemed 
to acquire the status of works of art. Cavell’s suspicion of both approaches is that 
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they become automatic, suppressing the space for judgment and thereby legitimating 
conformism, imitation, and posturing; we might think of this as their becoming ideo-
logical. As Cavell puts the matter, “The philistine audience cannot afford to admit 
the new; the avant-garde audience cannot afford not to.”3 In aesthetic appreciation, 
this seems especially damaging, for personal judgment plays an essential part in 
the response that art elicits; without this, it is void. Properly aesthetic judgment, 
as opposed to knowledge about works of art, depends upon knowledge in feeling.
The tendency of these positions to shore themselves up is a step toward the 
restriction of judgment but also in the containment of chance. Now, music’s relation 
to chance is complex, and it is worth considering some of the different junctures 
at which it becomes most significant. The production of a piece of music involves 
decisions in relation to chance. In, for example, a folk song, the words and basic tune 
may originate with the composer, but it will be open to the performer to choose the 
instrumentation, pitch, rhythm, accentuation, level of ornamentation, and so on. In 
the work of Handel or Bach, the composer has determined most of what happens, 
but much is left open to the performers. One can, Cavell suggests, imagine such 
music as improvised. In orchestral music after Beethoven, by contrast, composers 
are far more prescriptive. These junctures offer occasions of varying scope for the 
performer to take chances.
What is at issue here can further be illustrated if we consider two polarized 
relations to chance in the new music itself. On the one hand, let us take the famous 
example of John Cage’s 4’33”. The composer and the performer cede control to 
chance: the audience hears whatever sounds there happen to be during the “silence” 
of the “performance.” On the other, there is the development of serialism and the 
possibility of total organization. The music is determined by a formal principle — 
the rule-governed sequencing of notes, using such patterns as repetition, reversal, 
inversion. The composer then cedes control to the sounds produced by the formula 
as it unfolds. Actions of performers are specified exhaustively. Where the composer 
programs a computer and the computer is wired up to produce the music, the role of 
the performer is cut out completely.
What can we say of the response of the listener? In the face of the difficulty 
of some of this music, it is not surprising if the reaction is one of rejection: “What 
a horrible noise! What is this about?” Behind this reaction there is the implicit 
question of what this means, of how it can be meant. But this prompts the question 
of what exactly it is to mean it. One standard response here is to resist the idea that 
the meaning of a work requires anyone to mean it. The work of art is autonomous, 
and to suppose otherwise is to succumb to the fallacy of authorial intention. There 
is a danger, however, that this comes to be interpreted in simplistic terms. While it 
is a fallacy to see the author as authoritative over the work of art that is produced, 
this should not imply that the work is seen outside context, and that context must 
include the circumstances of its production. That production cannot be understood 
in the absence of some sense of its being a communication between human beings. 
Cavell’s positioning of his own argument in relation to the “autonomy of the work 
of art” is designed to embed the idea of its meaning in the broader circumstances 
of human life:
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My claims do not rest upon works of art themselves, apart from their relations to how such 
works are made and the reasons for which they are made, and considering that some are sin-
cere and some counterfeit…. My claim is that to know such things is to know what a work of 
art is — they are, if one may say so, part of its grammar. And, of course, I may be taken in.4
The Wittgensteinian idea of grammar here plainly locates these remarks within a 
conception of meaning as use: to know what “meaning it” means will entail that the 
circumstances of production, including the commitments of the artist or composer, 
cannot simply be excluded. There is an autonomy to the work of art in that it exists 
independently of, and in principle survives, its creator; but if a work is to be taken 
not simply as “having meaning” but as “being meant,” then this autonomy must be 
understood as compatible with, and indeed requiring, realism about the circumstances 
of its production. Without a work of art’s being meant, there would be no scope for 
thinking of it in terms of it as sincere, authentic, imitative, counterfeit, or fraudulent, 
though this is surely a register of response against which such works are commonly 
understood. It is part of the way that works of art are judged. It is partly why we 
come to those works.
The particular kind of knowledge that the work deals in — that is, knowledge 
in feeling — relies in a singular way on such assessments. But the idea of knowing 
in feeling requires further attention. Cavell elaborates as follows:
What the expression “known by feeling” suggests are facts (or experiences) such as these: 
(1) What I know when I’ve seen or heard something is, one may wish to say, not a matter of 
merely knowing it. But what more is it? Well, as the words say, it is a matter of seeing it. But 
one could also say that it is not a matter of merely seeing it. But what more is this? … (2) 
“Knowing by feeling” is not like “knowing by touching”; that is, it is not a case of providing 
a basis for a claim to know. But one could say that feeling functions as a touchstone: … it is 
directed to an object, the object has been tested, the result is one of conviction.5
This not-merely-knowing-it implies that what is at stake here is not reducible to 
information; it is not something that could be registered adequately in a truth table. 
So there is, then, an emphasis on the experience of coming to know it. But — at least 
on Wittgensteinian lines — knowledge could never be understood just as an experi-
ence or as a mental state. But this is not the (only) reason why Cavell differentiates 
what he is concerned with from knowing by touching, where again the experiential 
is to the fore. He goes on to emphasize the way that, following the experience, the 
relation stands fast for one, which is not the same as saying that it is a mental state: 
it is there when one recalls it; and it provides an orientation for other thoughts and 
judgments. To be a touchstone it does not need to be continually touched. Yet as 
one comes to know this thing or as one recalls it, one is compelled by a sense of its 
importance. Cavell continues:
This seems to suggest to me why one is anxious to communicate the experience of such ob-
jects…. I want to tell you something I have seen or heard or realized, or come to understand…. 
Only I find that I can’t tell you; and that makes it all the more urgent to tell you…. It matters, 
there is a burden, because unless I can tell what I know, there is a suggestion (and to myself 
as well) that I do not know. But I do — what I see is that (pointing to an object). But for that 
to communicate you have to see it too. Describing one’s experience of art is itself a form of 
art; the burden of describing it is like the burden of producing it.6
That there is something that one feels one must say and that this cannot be said, and 
that there are no unproblematic formulae for its articulation — such factors constitute 
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the terrain in which what “meaning it” might amount to stands out in relief. It is where 
the possibilities of fraudulence, of exaggeration, of evasion, and of bombast most 
significantly present themselves. And these vices themselves indicate by contrast 
why our meaning it, our authentic expression, should matter.
In aesthetic judgment, and in music specifically, questions about how something 
is meant can appear in three particular kinds of circumstance or roles. First, in aes-
thetic judgment, the critic must ask, “Am I just reiterating a received point of view? 
Am I using the exercise merely to express my personal whims or preoccupations? 
Or perhaps just to curry favor? Am I relying on stock phrasing and convention in 
articulating my response, as if every review were approached with a journalistic 
template at hand?” Second, in improvisation, the musician should be attuned to 
concerns that might be expressed as “Does this seem borrowed? Does it resort to 
familiar moves, clichés of expression? How and why do the departures I introduce 
work?” And third, in the performance, say, of a late nineteenth century symphony, 
the questions for the performer might become “Is the performance dull or merely 
dutiful? Is it technically competent but inexpressive? Is the performance appropriately 
given to the moment, the occasion?”
These questions are not to be settled by the provision of sets of criteria that 
would legislate between the sincere and the fraudulent, and adjudicate over borderline 
cases. But the alternative to sets of criteria need not be anything occult; it need not 
be a matter of mystification. Judgments can be made, and these can be expressed, 
sometimes in a faltering way, and sometimes with greater confidence, but typically 
in a way that is open to challenge. One must venture one’s thoughts, knowing that 
they may meet with rebuff: “Surely you don’t mean that! How can you see it like 
that?” And as should be obvious in the context of music, this exercise of judgment 
will, for the improviser and performer, require something other than verbal expres-
sion: it will require interpretation and originality, the taking of a chance. Whether 
this works or not, whether it convinces, will in part be a product of conditions that 
could not be exhaustively expressed, involving traditions of practice in which certain 
performances, approaches, and techniques become familiar, and some stand out. It 
is in this open space that the possibility of exercising judgment becomes real. In 
speaking of whether a work is meaningful, has value, is sincere, is art, and so on, or 
whether my judgment is sincere, etc., there is nothing beyond each case of judging 
(improvisation, performance), other than other cases of judging and the way these 
inform one another, the precedents, and the comparisons they afford. And to the extent 
that the judgments in those cases have become conventional and stale, the fabric of 
our practice will quickly become depleted. Such judgment cannot be based upon 
sets of criteria or theorization: it must in the end draw upon knowledge in feeling.
II
These questions of knowledge in feeling and its pertinence to judgment, impinge 
on education in multiple ways, but I realize that this is as yet far from explicit. To 
make clearer why this is so, let me force a comparison. In the foregoing discussion, 
I have explored the idea of knowledge in feeling in terms of three key figures in the 
production of music: the composer, the performer/improviser, and the critic. The 
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parallel I want to force, which roughly follows the same sequence of production and 
reception, is to relate the roles in music to those in education along the following lines:
• the composer to the policymaker or curriculum planner;
• the performer/improviser to the teacher; 
• and the critic to the student.
This makes it possible to explore parallels in ideological influences. In music, I 
identified these above in terms of the traditional-ideological (Saint-Saëns) and the 
theoretical-ideological (Krenek). The traditional-ideological in education might be 
seen, for example, in uncritical faith in the canon, in reliance on the idea of what every 
American should know, or — within the main currents of philosophy of education — 
in holding that there must be an essence to education, which foundationalist enquiry 
either has uncovered or will eventually uncover. By contrast, the theoretical-ideological 
might be identified in ways in which an abstract model is imposed on practice. One 
might think, first, of the imposition of systematic planning on the organization of 
teaching and learning, of understanding the relation between teaching and content in 
terms of efficient delivery. One might think of the reduction of teaching as a result 
of the supposed efficiency and reliability of the teacher-proof curriculum. And in 
terms of the substance of the curriculum, one might recall the prominence that is 
given to such “transferable” skills as information access, communication, enterprise, 
and interpersonal skills — all of which undermine the importance of a substantive, 
judgment-rich engagement with content. I fully accept that my characterizations 
here are severely underdrawn, but I identify them as a means to move the argument 
on. What they have in common, as in the case of the ideologizations in music, is 
the tendency to confine the arena of judgment — for the policymaker, the teacher, 
and the student herself. 
As I have acknowledged, there are many ways in which the ideological parallels 
sketched above might be drawn, and to some extent they may indeed seem somewhat 
forced. But my concern is not really there — that is, not primarily with critique. It 
is with evocation of the space of judgment (judgment in action, improvisation, etc., 
and judgment on action, art works, what is taught, etc.), in a space not dominated by 
these ideological assurances. In opposition to those tendencies, therefore, the point in 
what follows will be to retrieve the place of judgment and a sense of its importance. 
Clearly this is to make teaching and learning more precarious matters, more vulner-
able to auditors and inspection regimes, but more amenable to the taking of chances.
Cavell, whose first degree was in music composition, has written on questions 
in and of the arts in multiple ways, and his work on literature and film is particularly 
influential; and early on, as a teenager, around the time of Charlie Parker’s chromatic 
experimentations, he played lead alto in a band of black musicians in Sacramento. 
Does this help to explain then why he approaches the topic of aesthetic judgment 
not only as a matter of intrinsic interest but rather because he finds in it something 
of much broader significance? Whereas knowledge in another field — in computer 
programming, say, or even in physics or history — has some value regardless of the 
engagement of the knower, in the absence of such involvement, aesthetic judgment is 
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void. Cavell takes aesthetic judgment to model political judgment, precisely because 
it depends upon my offering my judgment and my voice, and this will depend upon 
how I see things, my believing things in feeling them. This is also to see democracy 
neither as a political settlement that is already in place nor as a project awaiting some 
final theorization that will put things onto secure foundations, once and for all, but 
rather as in essence dependent upon the voices of each one of us. The exercise of 
voice does not mean the assertion of desires, commitments, and projects that are 
somehow there and ready-made, but an exploration in judgment, and the expression 
of judgment in conversation, in the course of which one may find what those desires, 
commitments, and projects might be.
Can I then take this also as indicating something about the way that the exercise 
of judgment in education might be? Let us revisit the three roles identified above. 
The student, like the art critic, needs at some point to see meaning for herself in what 
is presented and to see how her teacher sees meaning in what is presented. Without 
this, some aspects of an education — for example, aesthetic appreciation — simply 
cannot take place. Of course, this is desirable across the range of the curriculum. But 
there is reason especially to see the importance of its extending through whatever 
will constitute the student’s political and moral education. The teacher, like the 
performer, must, in presenting what she knows, be bearing witness to what makes 
sense and has meaning for her. Learners rely in so many respects on the testimony 
of the teacher, but this is not to say only that they depend upon reported knowledge: 
they depend upon her presence in the report she makes. Where she is not present in 
this way, where she is just dutifully going through the exercises, her students may 
experience her teaching as not meant, and hence as tainted with a kind of fraudulence. 
And the policymaker or curriculum planner, like the composer, should be newly 
sensitized to the fact that it is in their power to give trust back to teachers and to 
construct the curriculum in such a way that space is opened for improvisation and 
performance — for the exercise of judgment in a dynamic engagement between the 
teacher, what is taught, and those who learn. If this were done, it would demand of 
teacher educators something that they have learned to deny. Yet this is a challenge 
that many would willingly take up: to create a profession of teaching worthy of the 
name, where schools do not merely pass on knowledge and skills but understand 
education as, in Cornel West’s words, “what stirs the soul.”7
III
The starting point for this discussion was the difficulty of reception of modernist 
works of art, a difficulty especially acute in music. In the decades since Cavell wrote 
his essay, Schoenberg’s influence has become less strong, and music has moved on 
in diverse ways. The new music today on the whole presents fewer difficulties for 
the listener than was the case with the music that Schoenberg inspired; and while 
Schoenberg’s own music continues to be difficult, it does not surprise in the way it 
once did. The same might be said of modern jazz. Music’s capacity to outrage and 
shock is not what it used to be. But that is partly because it is not only music but 
innovation that has moved on.
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To see how and why this is so, it would be necessary to make reference to 
technological change, especially insofar as this has enhanced copying, sampling, 
and mixing techniques, expanded the ways in which sound can be produced, and 
rendered archives of recording accessible on an unprecedented scale. This alters our 
expectations of music and our capacity to be surprised; it can turn innovation into 
parody and pastiche; and it also has its influence on the ways in which improvisa-
tion and the space for judgment are conceived. There are surely parallels here in 
our ways of teaching and learning more generally and in our expectations of what 
education can be.
It may be then that the tensions exposed by modernist works of art, with the 
opposing ideological forces in relation to which Cavell orients his discussion, con-
stitute a drama in which the stakes for judgment can be brought to the fore. The 
challenge remains for education today to keep these tensions and those possibilities 
of judgment in view.
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